Your connection, examined against the post-quantum standards.
This endpoint presents a certificate signed with ML-DSA (FIPS 204) and negotiates a hybrid post-quantum key exchange. Everything below is measured from this session — no user-agent guesses, no client-side simulation.
ASSESSING SESSION…
Reading the negotiated parameters from the server.
01 · Handshake observed
Parameters reported by the terminating TLS stack for your connection.
| Protocol | … |
| Cipher suite | … |
| Key exchange group | … |
| Certificate signature | … |
| ALPN / HTTP version | … |
| Session resumption | … |
| SNI presented | … |
| Client address | … |
02 · Certificate analysis
The two profiles this service publishes, and what each one actually proves.
Post-quantum profile
| Algorithm | … |
| Issuer | … |
| Validity | … |
| Signature size | … |
| Public key size | … |
| NIST category | … |
Classical profile
| Algorithm | … |
| Issuer | … |
| Validity | … |
| Key size | … |
| Threat model | … |
| Status | … |
What a certificate can and cannot do. ML-DSA signs; ML-KEM (FIPS 203) is what protects the session key. A certificate never encrypts a session on its own — a page that claims otherwise is wrong. See the classical analysis for the fallback view.
03 · Client capability probe
A real handshake attempt against the ML-DSA-only endpoint. Failure is the expected result today.
Attempt ML-DSA authentication
Not run yet. The probe requests the same host on the post-quantum port, where only ML-DSA certificates are accepted.
Verify independently. A browser cannot prove which authentication algorithm the server used; these commands can, and they are the record we accept as evidence.
openssl s_client -connect qsotest.qdfs.io:8443 -servername qsotest.qdfs.io -tls1_3 -groups X25519MLKEM768 </dev/null 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -text | grep -E "Signature Algorithm|Public Key Algorithm"
04 · Client support matrix
Two different capabilities get confused constantly. They are listed separately.
| Client family | Hybrid key exchange X25519MLKEM768 | ML-DSA certificate authentication | Guidance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Loading matrix… | |||
05 · Standards basis
What this service is measured against, and what is still missing in the public PKI.
| FIPS 203 — ML-KEM | Key encapsulation (from CRYSTALS-Kyber). Protects the session key. |
| FIPS 204 — ML-DSA | Digital signature (from CRYSTALS-Dilithium). Signs the certificate on the post-quantum port. |
| FIPS 205 — SLH-DSA | Hash-based signature. Conservative fallback, not used here. |
| RFC 9881 | ML-DSA in X.509 — the encoding this certificate uses. |
| RFC 9935 | ML-KEM in X.509 — needed for KEM-only certificates. |
Public trust is the gap. No public certificate authority may yet issue ML-DSA certificates for TLS, so this host serves a private post-quantum CA. That is a deliberate, auditable choice — not a shortcut.
06 · Document integrity
This page is signed. Any modification of the served bytes invalidates the signature.
| SHA-256 of this document | … |
| Signature algorithm | … |
| Signature (base64) | … |
| Signing key | … |
curl -s https://qsotest.qdfs.io/ -o /tmp/page.html && sha256sum /tmp/page.html curl -s https://qsotest.qdfs.io/integrity.json -o /tmp/integrity.json # signature must verify with the published post-quantum CA below curl -s https://qsotest.qdfs.io/certs/qdfs-pq-ca.pem -o /tmp/ca.pem