QDFS · GRANBELL UKPOST-QUANTUM VERIFICATION TERMINAL
TLS 1.3 · Cryptographic posture report

Your connection, examined against the post-quantum standards.

This endpoint presents a certificate signed with ML-DSA (FIPS 204) and negotiates a hybrid post-quantum key exchange. Everything below is measured from this session — no user-agent guesses, no client-side simulation.

ASSESSING SESSION…

Reading the negotiated parameters from the server.

01 · Handshake observed

Parameters reported by the terminating TLS stack for your connection.

Source: server-side TLS variables, read on this request.
Protocol…
Cipher suite…
Key exchange group…
Certificate signature…
ALPN / HTTP version…
Session resumption…
SNI presented…
Client address…

02 · Certificate analysis

The two profiles this service publishes, and what each one actually proves.

SERVED NOW

Post-quantum profile

Algorithm…
Issuer…
Validity…
Signature size…
Public key size…
NIST category…
BASELINE

Classical profile

Algorithm…
Issuer…
Validity…
Key size…
Threat model…
Status…

What a certificate can and cannot do. ML-DSA signs; ML-KEM (FIPS 203) is what protects the session key. A certificate never encrypts a session on its own — a page that claims otherwise is wrong. See the classical analysis for the fallback view.

03 · Client capability probe

A real handshake attempt against the ML-DSA-only endpoint. Failure is the expected result today.

Attempt ML-DSA authentication

Not run yet. The probe requests the same host on the post-quantum port, where only ML-DSA certificates are accepted.

Verify independently. A browser cannot prove which authentication algorithm the server used; these commands can, and they are the record we accept as evidence.

openssl s_client -connect qsotest.qdfs.io:8443 -servername qsotest.qdfs.io -tls1_3 -groups X25519MLKEM768 </dev/null 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -text | grep -E "Signature Algorithm|Public Key Algorithm"

04 · Client support matrix

Two different capabilities get confused constantly. They are listed separately.

Key exchange = protects the session secret today. Certificate authentication = what a quantum computer attacks.
Client familyHybrid key exchange
X25519MLKEM768
ML-DSA certificate
authentication
Guidance
Loading matrix…

05 · Standards basis

What this service is measured against, and what is still missing in the public PKI.

FIPS 203 — ML-KEMKey encapsulation (from CRYSTALS-Kyber). Protects the session key.
FIPS 204 — ML-DSADigital signature (from CRYSTALS-Dilithium). Signs the certificate on the post-quantum port.
FIPS 205 — SLH-DSAHash-based signature. Conservative fallback, not used here.
RFC 9881ML-DSA in X.509 — the encoding this certificate uses.
RFC 9935ML-KEM in X.509 — needed for KEM-only certificates.

Public trust is the gap. No public certificate authority may yet issue ML-DSA certificates for TLS, so this host serves a private post-quantum CA. That is a deliberate, auditable choice — not a shortcut.

06 · Document integrity

This page is signed. Any modification of the served bytes invalidates the signature.

SHA-256 of this document…
Signature algorithm…
Signature (base64)…
Signing key…
curl -s https://qsotest.qdfs.io/ -o /tmp/page.html && sha256sum /tmp/page.html
curl -s https://qsotest.qdfs.io/integrity.json -o /tmp/integrity.json
# signature must verify with the published post-quantum CA below
curl -s https://qsotest.qdfs.io/certs/qdfs-pq-ca.pem -o /tmp/ca.pem